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Abstract 
The main goal of this study is to demonstrate the existence of a significant empirical link between 
infrastructure and financial sectors reforms the effects of which are reflected in infrastructure 
sectors performance. This paper reports on the findings of an exploration of this issue for the case of 
the power sector in developing countries. We estimate the impact of the four main components of 
the power sector reform in these countries, namely, the creation of an independent regulatory 
agency, the unbundling of generation, transmission, and distribution, the introduction of 
competition and the implementation of privatization programs in the generation and distribution 
segments, on some of this sector’s performance outcomes, and attempt to assess the contribution of 
the domestic financial systems’ reforms to these outcomes. In a dataset on 42 developing countries 
covering the 1990-2005 period, we find that private participation in generation and distribution has 
significantly improved power supply as reflected in higher electricity generation per capita and 
technical and labor efficiency in the distribution segment. The unbundling of generation, 
transmission, and distribution has contributed to improving productive efficiency through a better 
use of the labor factor in the distribution segment. We find that the creation of a separate regulatory 
agency has boosted the generation segment in terms of both capacity and sales and has generated 
better incentives for a more efficient use of labor input in the distribution segment. We also find that 
regulatory experience has significantly contributed to improving access to electricity. The results 
suggest that while the power sector, in particular, its generation segment, has significantly benefited 
from the introduction of independent regulation, the beneficial effects of (good) regulatory practices 
have been exacerbated by the modernization of the financial systems. More specifically, improved 
financial systems have eased access to capital for operators allowing them to upgrade their networks 
and decrease power losses in distribution. The overall results obtained in this paper strongly 
recommend that along with reforming the power sector, policy makers in developing countries 
should implement the financial reforms that would deepen their domestic financial systems thus 
allowing them to recover the full benefits of these systems’ positive externalities on the 
performance of the sector. 
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1. Introduction 
As in most parts of the world, infrastructure services in developing countries were traditionally 
provided by stated-owned vertically integrated monopolies. However, this model has become 
plagued by poor performance due to various factors including political interference, inefficient 
management, and under-investment.1 With limited resources, the public sector alone in these 
countries cannot ensure adequate funding together with the operational activities necessary to 
provide quality of service. This situation has led to a soaring need to upgrade networks and has 
made the financing of infrastructure projects even more challenging as demand for infrastructure 
services has substantially increased following population growth and large-scale urbanization. 
In the late 80s and early 90s many developing countries conducted important structural 
reforms of their infrastructure sectors and gave high priority to the objectives of reducing the cost of 
the public budget by promoting foreign and domestic private investment in these sectors. In the 
power sector, although they varied across countries, the implemented reforms mainly consisted of a 
combination of four policies, namely, the unbundling of the generation, transmission, and 
distribution activities of the vertically integrated utilities, the privatization of the transmission and 
distribution segments of the industry, the introduction of competition in the generation segment, and 
the creation of an energy regulatory authority. In parallel to these sectoral reforms, large efforts 
were made to modernize the banking and financial system. 
Privatization coupled with competition are meant to enhance efficiency, innovation, and 
customer responsiveness while independent regulation, as an alternative to centralized regulation by 
a government department, improves investors’ confidence and consumers protection.2 Indeed, 
degree of competition and ownership are known from basic theory (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) to 
be key determinants of the levels of outputs, costs, and prices, and hence of the level of allocative 
and productive efficiency in the market. Therefore, provided they are properly designed and 
implemented, the electricity sector reforms conducted in developing countries were expected to 
enhance industry performance as reflected in higher access and usage demand and greater 
efficiency of supply. 
In practice though, the power sector reform encountered great difficulties in many 
developing countries due to institutional weaknesses and lack of modern financial systems crucial 
to sustain the development of a sector that necessitates large capital investments. As a consequence, 
the establishment of appropriate regulatory bodies and the building of capacity have followed a 
                                                          
1The public good nature of infrastructure services, the existence of externalities, and the incompleteness of markets are 
the main market failures that have traditionally justified state intervention. However, these services are increasingly 
becoming rival and excludable goods therefore questioning the necessity of public intervention. 
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 See Jasmab et al. (2005) and Zhang et al. (2002) for a discussion of these points. 
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slow and complex process (Cubbin and Stern, 2006, Zhang et al., 2008). This led observers to 
question not only the efficiency of the sectoral and financial reforms themselves, but also their 
interaction and the timing of their introduction. This paper seeks to feed in the academic debate on 
these issues by exploring them in a panel dataset on the power and financial sectors in 42 
developing countries from 1990 to 2005.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature on the 
impact of the power sector and financial reforms on the electricity industry performance and 
extracts from the main findings of this literature a set of hypotheses to be tested empirically. Section 
3 describes the data and presents the econometric approach used to analyze them. Section 4 reports 
the results of our empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the empirical results in relation with the 
hypotheses and concludes. The appendix provides some complementary material. 
 
2. Impact of sectoral and financial reforms on industry performance in electricity 
The major part of the literature that has attempted to evaluate the performance of the infrastructure 
industries reforms has been concerned with developed countries and among those on developing 
countries only a few has examined the electricity sector.3 This gap is partly due to the lack of 
consistent data on the sector that allow rigorous econometric analysis and partly to the difficulty in 
finding/constructing accurate indicators of the various energy reform policies implemented by 
developing countries. In this section, we briefly review some studies that are most related to our 
work as to their objectives and methodology and derive a number of testable hypotheses. 
An important dimension of the power sector reform is the unbundling of vertically-
integrated electricity utilities into corporatized generation, transmission, and distribution usually 
coupled with a change of ownership and management in the generation and distribution segments 
and the introduction of competition in these two segments. The literature on the incentive effects of 
ownership structure (see, e.g., North, 1990, Levy and Spiller, 1996) and agency and public choice 
theories (see Niskanen, 1971, Boycko and Vishny, 1996, among others) provide useful insights on 
the impact of privatization on economic performance. Privatization is expected to improve 
economic efficiency by (i) changing the allocation of property rights resulting in different 
incentives for management; (ii) removing the budget constraint of taxpayer support and exposing 
firms to the discipline of the private capital market; (iii) setting more precise and measurable 
objectives, such as loss reduction, thereby decreasing transaction costs, in particular, those related 
to management monitoring by principals; (iv) removing political interference with management.  
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 Being historically at the forefront of the reform wave that has profoundly affected infrastructure sectors worldwide, 
the telecommunications industry reforms have been subject to far deeper empirical analysis. Among others, see Fink et 
al. (2003), Gasmi and Recuero Virto (2010), Gasmi et al. (2011), Ros (1999), and Walsteen (2001). 
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When applying these theoretical arguments to the electricity industry, however, needless to 
say that one should account for the specific characteristics of the sector. Indeed, electricity 
production is associated with large sunk investments, generally exhausted economies of scale, and 
non-storable and massively consumed output which may lead to government opportunistic behavior 
vis-à-vis private investors, and hence affect their incentives to invest in generation. Consequently, 
whether privation would necessarily lead to capacity expansion is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, it is 
safe to say that technical and operating efficiency may be expected following privatization and this 
is likely to result in efficient utilization of installed capacity, capital, and labor. 
Competition is viewed as a reliable mechanism to improve allocative and productive or 
technical efficiency. Indeed, in a competitive market, prices reflect firms’ costs and productive 
efficiency and hence by putting downward pressure on prices, competition can be expected to 
increase technical and operating efficiency as well as labor productivity. In turn, the improved 
technical efficiency may lead to lower prices, hence to higher demand which in turn is likely to 
increase capacity and supply (Leibenstein, 1966, Zhang et al., 2002).  
The existing empirical studies on the impact of the reforms on performance in the 
developing countries’ electricity industry have led to mixed results essentially due to the diversity 
of the econometric methodologies and the samples of countries analyzed. Gassner et al. (2009) 
investigate whether private sector participation in electricity distribution has improved economic 
performance in a panel of 71 developing and transition countries over the 1900-2002 period and 
report that labor productivity and operational efficiency have indeed increased. Zhang et al (2002) 
examine the impacts of privatization, competition, and regulation on the electricity sector’s 
performance using a data set on 51 developing countries over the period 1985-2000. Their empirical 
results suggest that competition has positive effects on service penetration, capacity expansion, 
labor efficiency, and prices to industrial users. Taken separately, privatization and regulation have 
no significant effect on performance, but the authors find that their interaction leads to greater 
electricity availability, more generation capacity, and higher labor productivity.  
Zhang et al (2005) study the impact of the sequencing of privatization, competition, and 
regulation on the electricity industry performance using data on 25 developing countries from 1985 
to 2001. While they find that individual reform indicators have negative but not significant effect on 
performance, these authors emphasize that creating a separate regulatory authority and introducing 
competition before privatization is associated with higher electricity generation and higher 
generating capacity. They also find that the introduction of competition before privatization 
enhances capital utilization measured by the ratio of electricity generation to average capacity.  
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Zhang et al (2008) extend their 2002 study (Zhang et al., 2002) by using some new measures 
of privatization, competition, and regulation and examining the impact of the electricity industry 
reform in a sample of 36 developing countries from 1985 to 2003. They reach the same conclusions 
as in their previous study, namely, that competition fosters generation, generating capacity, and 
labor productivity while privatization and regulation do not. They however find evidence of some 
positive effects of the interactions of privatization with regulation and competition. In contrast, Sen 
and Jasmab (2010) find in a sample of 19 Indian States from 1991 to 2007 that unbundling, 
privatization in distribution, and regulation tend to worsen technical and operating efficiency and 
gross generation decreases with privatization. As to the effects of the reforms on electricity prices, 
regulation and unbundling have positive but not significant effects on average electricity price while 
the existence of an independent regulatory body is associated with a significant increase in the 
average industrial price. 
Some studies have focused on the effects of regulation and governance on performance. 
Cubbin and Stern (2006) examine the impacts of the existence of a regulatory law and regulatory 
governance on performance in power generation segment controlling for privatization and 
competition. In a panel data set of 28 developing countries covering the period 1980-2001, they find 
that both regulatory law and quality of regulatory governance have positive and significant effects 
on per capita generation capacity. Moreover, these impacts increase with the regulatory agency’s 
experience and reputation.  
Andres et al. (2009) construct an index of quality of regulatory governance and investigate 
the effects of change in ownership and of various characteristics of the regulatory agency on the 
performance of 250 electricity utilities in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1995 to 2005. 
These authors’ results indicate that, independently of ownership the mere existence of a regulatory 
institution significantly enhances performance. They also find that the coefficients associated with 
the ownership dummies in the performance regressions have the expected signs and are significant. 
The result found by Cubbin and Stern (2006), that experience in regulation and quality of 
governance have significant effects on performance, is also confirmed by this study. 
The least one can say from the above overview of the empirical literature that seeks to 
evaluate the reforms of the electricity industry in developing countries is that the conveyed 
messages are somewhat mixed. In what follows, we structure the results discussed in this literature 
into a set of hypotheses that we will attempt to test in our data. We take the view that an explanation 
of the divergence of the results obtained might be that some important factors that affect the 
working of sectoral reforms and hence their impact on industry performance have been omitted in 
the studies. In this paper, we argue that financial reforms play a non-negligible role in the 
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determination of the outcomes of sectoral reforms. Hence, we incorporate in the analysis of the 
impact of sectoral reforms on industry performance their possible interaction with financial reforms. 
Despite the fact that the importance of financial systems for development has been 
emphasized in the literature and that the impact of sectoral reforms on performance has drawn much 
attention, to our knowledge, the combined effect of sectoral and financial reforms on sectoral 
performance remains relatively weakly explored.4 This paper seeks to contribute to filling this void 
by empirically investigating how the level of development of domestic financial systems affects the 
impacts of sectoral reforms on the performance of the power sector in developing countries.   
In a recent paper, Ba and Gasmi (2011) find a positive link between financial reforms and 
the level of development of financial systems in a dataset on 54 developing countries covering the 
1973-2005 period. Using a 1990-2007 dataset on 56 developing countries, Ba et al. (2010) 
demonstrate that the level of financial development is a key determinant of the electricity sector 
attractiveness for private investors which, itself, is crucial for its growth. In this paper, we seek to 
test the hypothesis that financial development, resulting from financial reforms, enhances the 
impact of the power sector reforms on this sector’s performance. Putting together the findings of Ba 
et al. (2010) and Ba and Gasmi (2011), an important policy implication of the empirical validity of 
this hypothesis would therefore be that infrastructure sectors’ reforms can be expected to benefit 
from financial reforms in terms of enhancing both the infrastructure sectors’ growth and 
performance.5 
While our main objective is to perform an econometric test of the hypothesis that financial 
development improves the impact of electricity industry reforms on this industry’s performance, we 
also seek to contribute to the empirical literature on the evaluation on the outcomes of these 
reforms. To this end, we organize the various findings reported in the literature, although somewhat 
divergent, into a set of hypotheses that reflect their main implications. Table 1 below, describes this 
set of hypotheses that we designate by H1 through H6. This table also presents our main hypothesis 
on the role of financial systems and for the purpose of simplifying our discussion, we will write HI  
to indicate the application of our hypothesis to the reform that HI , I=1, 2, … , 6 is concerned with. 
Hence, for example, saying that H6  is not rejected by the data means that, all things equal, there is 
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 For empirical evidence on the relationship between financial development and economic growth, see Ang and 
McKibbin (2005), Ben Naceur et al. (2008), De Gregorio (1999), Huang (2006), Klein and Olivei (2001), and Levine 
(2001). 
5
 The reader might wonder why we didn’t use directly the indicators of the financial sector reforms in the empirical 
analysis (We thank E. Auriol for having raised this issue.). First, see Ba and Gasmi (2011), the number of those 
indicators is so large that incorporating them in our regressions would make the econometrics intractable. Instead, given 
the positive relationship found between these indicators and the indicator of financial development, we chose to use the 
latter as a way of synthesizing a large set of information on the financial reforms. Second, the option of using directly 
the indicators of financial reforms was not feasible for us anyway because of incompatibility of datasets.  
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enough empirical evidence in the data that financial development has made stronger the impact of 
competition on technical and operating efficiency. 
 
Table 1 - Testable hypotheses 
Hypothesis Content 
H1 Unbundling and privatization lead to higher 
capacity, generation, and access to electricity 
 
H2 Unbundling and privatization lead to higher 
operating and technical efficiency 
 
H3 Unbundling and privatization lead to higher labor 
efficiency 
 
H4 Establishment of independent regulatory authority 
enhances "industry  performance" 
 
H5 Competition leads to higher capacity and output 
 
H6 Competition leads to higher operating and technical 
efficiency 
 
HI , I=1,2,…,6 Financial development affects industry performance 
through its interaction with the sectoral reform 
concerned by hypothesis HI 
 
3. Data and econometric models 
To investigate the effects of sectoral reforms on the electricity industry performance accounting for 
the country’s level of financial development, we collected data on 42 developing countries in Latin 
America and Caribbean (LAC), Asia, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) over the period from 1990 to 2005. Table 2 below lists these countries and gives the 
World Bank income group each of these countries belongs to.6 The period of the study was imposed 
to us by data availability. However, we should mention that little or no reform has occurred in 
developing countries before 1990 and that our panel is unbalanced as not all the data were available 
for all the years for all of the 42 countries. 
Table 3 below exhibits the list of variables on which data have been collected.7 The 
electricity performance measures, the dependent variables in this study, are those that are under the 
label "Electricity sector performance" in this table. These variables are net electricity generation per 
capita (generationpc), installed generation capacity per capita (gencapacitypc), sales per employee 
(salesperemp), electricity losses in the distribution network (distlosses), and the number of 
connections per 100 inhabitants (connect). These measures are meant to capture respectively the 
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 A country is considered as a lower middle income country when its 2008 GNI per capita is between $976 and $3,855, 
a higher middle income country when its 2008 GNI per capita is between $3,856 and $11,905, and a low income 
country when its 2008 GNI per capita is equal to $975 or less. 
7
 More detailed information on these variables and some descriptive statistics are given in the appendix. 
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quantity of electricity supplied during a given year in a given country, labor efficiency, operating 
and technical efficiency in distribution, and the extent of access to electricity by the population.8 
 
Table 2 - Sample countries 
Country World Bank region World Bank income group 
Argentina Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Bangladesh South Asia Low income 
Belize Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Brazil Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Chile Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
China East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Colombia Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Cote d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Dominica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Dominican Republic Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Egypt Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Grenada Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Guatemala Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Honduras Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
India South Asia Lower middle income 
Indonesia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Jamaica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Malaysia East Asia and Pacific Upper middle income 
Mexico Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Morocco Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
Nicaragua Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Panama Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Paraguay Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Peru Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Philippines East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income 
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income 
Sri Lanka South Asia Lower middle income 
St Kitts and Nevis Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
St Lucia Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
St Vincent and the Grenadines Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Thailand East Asia and Pacific Lower middle income 
Tunisia Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
Turkey Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Uruguay Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Venezuela Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Zimbabwe Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
 
The independent variables on which we will focus are grouped under the labels "Electricity 
sector reforms" and "Financial development." The sectoral reform variables comprise indicators of 
privatization in generation, privatization in distribution, unbundling, competition, and existence of a 
regulatory body independent from the ministry of energy. Ideally, privatization in generation would 
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 The measures of net generation, generation capacity, and electricity distribution losses were available only for LAC 
countries. 
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be measured by the percentage of electricity produced by private companies or by the percentage of 
generation capital owned by private investors. Similarly, competition would be best measured by 
some sort of concentration ratio for each country’s electricity sector and some information on the 
quality of regulatory governance in each country would have been suitable for the analysis. 
Unfortunately, such (quantitative) data were not consistently available for all the countries in the 
sample and so far only limited information on the design of regulatory institutions in developing 
countries is available. 
 
Table 3 - Variables and designation 
Variable Designation 
Electricity sector performance 
generationpc Net generation per capita 
gencapacitypc Installed generation capacity per capita 
salesperemp Sales per employee 
distlosses Distribution losses 
connect Connections per 100 inhabitants 
 
Electricity sector reforms  
ppgen Privatization in generation 
ppdist Privatization in distribution 
sepreg Separated regulator 
expreg Experience of regulator 
unbundling Unbundling of generation, transmission, & distribution  
competition Wholesale market 
 
Financial development 
findev Overall financial development  
 
Institutional quality and risk 
countryrisk Country risk  
govtstability Government stability 
 
Economic development and population 
distribution 
 
gdp GDP per capita 
urbanization Urban population 
 
To circumvent these difficulties, we constructed dichotomous dummy variables indicating 
whether the electricity sector has been "unbundled" into its three segments (unbundling), whether 
there exists a wholesale market where generators can compete to conclude supply contracts with 
distributors or large users (competition), whether private participation exists in the generation 
segment (ppgen), and whether a separate regulatory authority not directly under the control of the 
Ministry of energy has been created (sepreg).9 We also use a variable that indicates the number of 
                                                          
9
 These dummy variables were constructed on the basis of information collected from various regulatory reports and 
websites which are listed in the references. We should mention that a wholesale market in generation is typically 
created when this segment is unbundled from transmission and distribution. Hence, the variables unbundling and 
competition should be highly correlated and, indeed, it is the case in our data where a correlation of 0.87 between them 
has been found. This led us to interpret and actually use these two variables in the regression analysis as substitutes for 
indicating that the power sector has experience (some) openness to competition. Finally, we should mention that the 
issue of whether or not the regulatory agency is truly independent from the political power is not addressed in this 
paper. 
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years since the regulatory agency has been created (expreg). Private participation in distribution 
(ppdist) is measured by the percentage of the total number of connections supplied by the private 
sector. 
To measure the level of financial development, our proxy for financial reforms, we use the 
variable findev which we calculate as the first principal component of financial variables that 
capture the development level of the banking sector and stock markets. For the banking sector we 
use the variables CBA, DMBA, and CBPC. Expressed as fractions of GDP, these indicators 
represent, respectively, total assets held by the Central Bank, total assets held by domestic financial 
institutions (to capture the depth of the banking sector), and total loans granted by commercial 
banks to the private sector. For the capital markets, we use the variables SMC, TVT, and SMT. The 
variables SMC and TVT are also expressed as ratios of GDP and represent, respectively, stock 
market capitalization and total value of shares traded on the stock market. These variables are meant 
to measure size and liquidity of the capital market respectively. The variable SMT is the domestic 
capital market turnover. Meant to assess the efficiency of the stock market, for a given year, it is 
calculated as the ratio of the total value of shares traded to the average market capitalization. 
In addition to variables of performance, sectoral reforms, and financial development, we use 
an indicator of the quality of a country’s institutions and a measure of this country’s level of risk as 
control variables. Presented under the label "Institutional quality and risk" in Table 3, these 
variables represent the country’s level of political and economic risk (countryrisk) and the ability of 
the government to commit to its announced economic program (govtstability). To account for 
economic growth and urbanization effects that have been discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Zhang 
et al., 2002), we use GDP per capita (gdp) and the share of the country’s total population which 
lives in urban areas (urbanization). These two variables are under the label "Economic development 
and population distribution." 
To estimate the effects of sectoral reforms and the level of financial development on the 
performance of the electricity industry, we run a set of single-equation regressions with the 
performance indicators as dependent variables. Part from the independent variables of main interest, 
namely, sectoral reforms and financial development indicators, the set of right-hand variables of 
these regressions comprises variables that capture some important features of the countries’ 
institutional and regulatory environment and level of economic development. Thus, these 
regressions provide us with an empirical framework that can be used to test the hypotheses on the 
impact of sectoral reforms discussed in the previous section (see Table 2) while controlling for 
these other features of a country’s economy. 
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Given that our data are in a pooled time-series cross-sectional form, we consider both fixed 
(FE) and random effects (RE) models and discriminate between these two specifications by means 
of a Hausman test. Note that the RE model assumes that the regressors are not correlated with the 
unobserved country effects. However, factors such as those related to the quality of governance and 
institutions are very likely to affect sectoral reforms measures and hence, when omitted, their 
impacts are included in the unobserved country effects leading to a correlation between the 
regressors and the country effects. Moreover, countries included in the sample analyzed are clearly 
not drawn randomly but are developing countries for which relevant data were available. Finally, 
we must indicate that we have performed a Fisher test that confirmed the presence of country fixed 
effects in all the specified models.10 These reasons led us to use fixed-effects panel models that 
control for country-specific unobserved effects.11 
Our empirical strategy consists of a stepwise procedure motivated by two main objectives. A 
first objective is to examine whether sectoral reforms have the expected effects on the electricity 
sector’s performance, i.e., to test hypotheses H1 through H6 discussed in the previous section. A 
second objective is to analyse the interaction between the financial and sectoral reforms. Thus, this 
second objective encompasses the testing of our main conjecture on the incremental effect of 
financial sector reform on performance, or equivalently, hypotheses H1 through H6 .  
The first objective is tackled by means of regressions of the following general form which 
we refer to as Model (1): 
 
7
0 1 2 3 4it i it it it j jit itjperf pp reg open Xα µ α α α α ε== + + + + + +∑  (1) 
 
Where  1,..., 42i =  and 1,...,16t =  are indices that refer to the country and the year respectively, 
perf is a variable of industry performance, pp is either ppgen or ppdist depending on the industry 
performance variable used, reg is either sepreg or expreg depending on goodness-of-fit, open is 
either unbundling or competition also depending on goodness-of-fit, the Xs are the control variables 
under the labels "Institutional quality and risk" and "Economic development and population 
distribution" in Table 3 above, the sα  are unknown parameters, iµ  is a fixed country effect term, 
and itε  is an error term. 
To achieve the second objective, which is to investigate the contribution of financial reforms 
to the impact of sectoral reforms on performance, we proceed in two steps. We first examine the 
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 The results of the Fisher test of the presence of country fixed effects are available from the authors upon request. 
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 We nevertheless realize that, even if the FE estimator is always consistent, the RE estimator, where applicable, is 
more efficient (Sen and Jasmab, 2010). 
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effect of sectoral reforms and financial development on performance through their interactions. This 
is achieved by estimating regressions of the following generic form referred to as Model (2): 
 
7
0 1 2 3 4
. . .it i it it it j jit itjperf pp findev reg findev open findev Xα µ α α α α ε== + + + + + +∑  (2) 
 
Where findev is the (principal component) index of financial development discussed earlier and the 
other variables are as defined above. The cross-terms in this specification are meant to capture the 
interactions between sectoral reforms and financial development. 
Finally, to investigate whether the different dimensions of the power sector reform affect 
directly industry performance or through their interaction with financial reforms or both, we run 
regressions of the following form referred to as Model (3):12 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
11
7 8
. .
.
it i it it it it it it
it j jit itj
perf pp reg open findev pp findev reg findev
open findev X
α µ α α α α α α
α α ε
=
= + + + + + + +
+ + +∑
  (3) 
 
Models (1) through (3) are estimated for each of the performance measures and some control 
variables are included depending on the performance variable used.13 Moreover, as sectoral reform 
indicators may influence each other and can also be determined by the performance of the 
electricity sector, endogeneity might be an issue and we account for it when appropriate in each 
regression. The next section presents the estimation results produced with Stata 11. 
 
4. Empirical results 
This section reports the estimation results of our econometric analysis. As indicated in the previous 
section, this analysis is organized around two main objectives.  We first estimate Model (1) to 
examine the effect of the various dimensions of the electricity sector reform on the industry 
performance.14 A regression is run for each of the performance measures described in Table 3 of the 
previous section. Then, to investigate the influence of financial development on these effects of the 
indicators of sectoral reform on performance, we proceed in two steps. First, we investigate the 
combined effect of sectoral reform and financial development on performance through their 
interactions by estimating Model (2). Second, we examine the robustness of these individual and/or 
combined effects in the larger model by regressing each of the performance measures on the 
sectoral reform indicators, the financial development index, and the cross-term that captures their 
interaction as specified in Model (3).  
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 Note that Models (1) and (2) are non-nested whereas both of these models are nested in Model (3). 
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 To alleviate multicollinearity problems due to high correlation, the independent variables were mean-centered.  
14
 The dependent variable has been re-scaled by taking the logarithm. 
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The estimation results are presented in Tables 4 through 8 below.15 Part from parameter 
estimates of the regressions based on Models (1), (2), and (3) presented respectively in the 2nd, 3rd, 
and 4th column, these tables report the number of observations actually used to estimate each model, 
Obs., the Fisher statistic to test the joint significance of the independent variables, F(.,.), and the 
adjusted 2R  of the model, 2R . When a right-hand-side variable, x say, turns out to be endogenous, 
that variable is instrumented by means of its lags and this is indicated in the tables by x_. 
Table 4 below presents the parameter estimates of the three models when the industry 
performance variable used is net electricity generation per capita. We see from the results on Model 
(1) that the creation of a separate regulator and privatization of the generation segment have a 
positive (marginal) effect on electricity generation per capita while the existence of a wholesale 
market has a negative effect. When using Model (2) in order to capture the interaction between the 
power sector and the financial sector reforms, we see that financial development strengthens the 
marginal effects of privatization and competition but not that of the creation of a separate regulatory 
agency.  When merging these two models into Model (3), the cross-effect of privatization with 
financial development is no longer significant while the variables of the creation of a separate 
regulatory instance and competition are significant both individually and when crossed with 
financial development. As to the control variables, gdp, urbanization, and govstability are all 
significant and have the expected sign. 
 
Table 4 - Electricity generation per capita regression parameter estimates 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  
intercept 3.93**** 3.87**** 3.86**** 
ppgen   0.14**** 
ppgen_ 0.02*   
sepreg 0.09****  0.07*** 
competition -0.08****  -0.24**** 
findev   0.01 
ppgen.findev  0.03*** 0.01 
sepreg.findev  0.04 0.08*** 
competition.findev  -0.07** -0.13**** 
gdp 0.00**** 0.00**** 0.00**** 
urbanization 0.03**** 0.03**** 0.03**** 
govtstability 0.01 0.02**** 0.01**** 
Obs. 380 288 288 
Fisher F( 33, 346) = 540.73**** F( 27, 260) = 571.86**** F( 31, 256) = 597.21**** 
2R  0.98 0.98 0.98 
 
Table 5 below shows the estimation results obtained when installed electricity generation 
capacity per capita is the variable used to measure industry performance. When Model (1) is used to 
estimate the individual sectoral reforms’ impact, we find that only the variable that captures the 
                                                          
15
 In these tables, we indicate by *, **, ***, and **** significance at the 20%, 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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existence of a separate regulatory agency is significant. When investigating the existence of cross-
effects with financial development, none of the sectoral reforms’ variables is significant. When 
Model (3), the nesting model, is estimated we find that the sectoral reforms’ variables that are 
individually significant are sepreg and competition which respectively indicate that a separate 
regulator has been created and wholesale market exists. The regression results show no evidence 
that financial development strengthens these reforms’ individual effects. The coefficients associated 
with the control variables gdp and urbanization are significant. 
 
Table 5 - Installed generation capacity per capita regression parameter estimates 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
intercept -2.81**** -2.98**** -2.37**** 
ppgen_ 0.01  0.00 
sepreg 0.04*  0.05* 
competition_ -0.01  -0.10**** 
findev_   0.00 
ppgen.findev_  0.01 -0.01 
sepreg.findev  0.01 0.08 
competition.findev_  0.02  
competition.findev   -0.07 
gdp 0.00**** 0.00**** 0.00**** 
urbanization 0.02**** 0.02**** 0.01*** 
Obs. 409 200 150 
Fisher F(39, 369) = 371.21**** F(28, 171) = 340.86**** F(27, 122) = 373.35**** 
2R  0.97 0.98 0.99 
 
Table 6 - Electricity sales per employee regression parameter estimates 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
intercept 6.85**** 5.95**** 5.03**** 
ppdist_ 0.00*  0.01* 
sepreg_ 1.01***  1.17** 
unbundling -1.54*  1.03** 
findev_   -0.51 
ppdist.findev  0.00 0.01 
sepreg.findev_  -0.06 0.43 
unbundling.findev  0.25 0.52 
gdp 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
Obs. 133 121 91 
Fisher F(23, 109) = 3.49**** F(18, 102) = 2.61**** F(20, 70) = 2.12*** 
2R  0.30 0.19 0.20 
 
When industry performance is measured by sales per employee in the distribution segment, 
a variable that is meant to capture labor productivity in that segment, see Table 6 above, Model (1) 
yields significant effects for the three sectoral reforms that indicate private participation, the 
existence of a separate regulator, and the unbundling of the three segments of the power sector, 
namely generation, transmission, and distribution. The estimated results obtained with Model (2) 
reveal no cross-effects between sectoral reforms and financial development and Model (3) confirms 
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these preliminary findings although in this latter model the sign of the variable unbundling 
becomes, as can be expected, positive. None of the control variables turns out to be significant. 
When the variable that measures the power losses in the distribution network is the 
dependent variable, the regression results obtained with Model (1), which are displayed in Table 7 
below, show a negative and significant coefficient for the variable that says that private 
participation in this segment exits and a positive and significant coefficient for the variable that 
indicates the existence of competition. When Model (2) is used to capture any cross-effects of these 
sectoral variables with financial development, the only variable that is significant is the one that 
indicates that some degree of competition exists. Merging these investigations of individual and 
cross-effects (Model (3)), we find that private participation is the only sectoral reform which has a 
significant individual effect on distribution losses and competition is the only one that has a 
significant cross-effect with financial development. As to the controls, we note the positive and 
negative significant effects of respectively gdp and urbanization. 
    
Table 7 - Distribution losses regression parameter estimates 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)  
intercept -3.07*** -2.67**** -3.32**** 
ppdist -0.00****  -0.00* 
sepreg -0.002  -0.02 
competition 0.13*  0.10 
findev   0.08 
ppdist.findev  0.00 -0.00 
sepreg.findev  0.11 0.06 
competition.findev  -0.23**** -0.18* 
gdp -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** 
urbanization 0.02 0.02** 0.02** 
govtstability 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
Obs. 178 129 129 
Fisher F(22, 155) = 25.65**** F(19, 109) = 48.68**** F(23, 105) = 41.01**** 
2R  0.75 0.88 0.88 
 
When the number of connections per 100 inhabitants is used as the measure of industry 
performance, the estimation of Model (1) yields a coefficient associated with the variable that 
represents regulatory experience, expreg, which is positive and significant (see Table 8 below). 
Moreover, when regulatory experience is crossed with financial development, the latter seems to 
increase the individual marginal effect of the former on population access to electricity as can be 
seen from the estimation of Model (2). However, when jointly estimating individual and cross 
effects by fitting in the data to Model (3), we see that this cross effect of regulatory experience with 
financial development is no longer significant suggesting that most of the access benefits are the 
results of favorable decisions made by experienced regulators. 
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Table 8 - Connections per 100 inhabitants regression parameter estimates 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
intercept 5.53* 9.96*** 11.12*** 
ppdist -0.00  0.00 
expreg 0.04**  0.12* 
competition -0.14  -0.13 
findev   0.22 
ppdist.findev  -0.00 0.00 
expreg.findev  0.02** -0.02 
competition.findev  0.04 -0.18 
gdp -0.00* -0.00 -0.00** 
urbanization -0.02 -0.07* -0.07 
Obs. 178 129 129 
Fisher F(21, 156) = 8.94**** F(18, 110) = 5.36**** F(22, 106) = 4.45**** 
2R  0.49 0.38 0.37 
 
What can we conclude from this analysis of the impact of the sectoral reforms on industry 
performance and the way they interact with the level of financial development? As discussed 
earlier, one way to tackle this question is to examine whether some empirical evidence can be 
extracted from the analysis on the validity of the various hypotheses stated in Table 1. Table 9 
below summarizes our findings.  This table gives the outcome of the test of each of the twelve 
hypotheses HI , HI , I=1,2,…,6. Its second column indicates whether or not each of these 
hypotheses has not been rejected in the data with a "Yes" or a "No" and, in the case where it has not 
been rejected, gives the variables involved in the relationship(s) that allowed us to conclude on the 
non-rejection.16 
Examining the validity of the hypotheses concerning the sectoral reforms’ individual effects 
on performance, we see that the only hypotheses which are not validated in our data are H5 and H6. 
Indeed, unexpectedly, we find that competition has decreased generation both in terms of capacity 
and actual output (see Tables 4 and 5) and no significant empirical evidence that competition on its 
own has led to higher operating and technical efficiency when power losses in the distribution 
network are used to proxy efficiency (see Table 7). However, when looking at the cross-effects of 
sectoral reforms with financial reforms, we see that the interaction between competition and 
financial development has made competition significantly improve technical efficiency (see Table 
7), i.e., H6  is not rejected as indicated in Table 9.17 Since financial development has significantly 
enhanced the marginal effect of the creation of a separate regulator on power generation per capita, 
as can be seen from Table 4, we conclude that H4  is not rejected as indicated in Table 9. 
                                                          
16
 The sign of the relationship(s) is given in parentheses. 
17
 Note also that interpreting the variables competition and unbundling as substitutes for representing market openness 
allows us to conclude that H2  is not rejected from Tables 7 as indicated in Table 9. 
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Table 9 - Hypotheses testing outcomes 
Hypothesis Test outcome 
H1 Yes 
ppgen  generationpc (+) 
H1  No 
 
H2 Yes 
ppdist  distlosses (-) 
H2  Yes 
competition  distlosses (-) 
 
H3 
 
Yes 
unbundling  salesperemp (+) 
ppdist  salesperemp (+) 
H3  No 
 
H4 
 
Yes 
sepreg  generationpc (+) 
sepreg  gencapacitypc (+) 
sepreg  salesperemp (+) 
expreg  connect (+) 
 
H4  Yes 
sepreg  generationpc (+) 
 
H5 
 
No 
H5  No 
 
H6 
 
No 
H6  Yes 
competition  distlosses (-) 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main motivation of this paper was to demonstrate the existence of a significant empirical link 
between infrastructure and financial sectors reforms the effects the effects of which are reflected in 
infrastructure sectors performance. This paper has reported on the findings of an exploration of this 
issue for the case of the power sector in developing countries. We have focused on the four main 
components of the power sector reform in these countries, namely, unbundling, competition, 
privatization, and regulation and examined their impact on some of this sector’s performance 
outcomes both on their own and via their interaction with financial reforms.  
The logic of the empirical strategy used relied on results found in some of our previous work 
in the area (Ba et al., 2010 and Ba et Gasmi, 2011). On the one hand, Ba and Gasmi (2011) find a 
significant positive link between financial reforms and the level of development of financial 
systems in a dataset on 54 developing countries covering the 1973-2005 period. On the other hand, 
using a dataset on 56 developing countries that covers the 1990-2007 period, Ba et al. (2010) 
provide empirical evidence on the importance of financial development for fostering private 
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investment in electricity projects and hence crucial to the growth and performance of the power 
sector. The empirical analysis conducted in the present paper allowed us to test whether financial 
development strengthens the impact of the power sector reforms on this sector’s performance. 
Putting together these findings, a conclusive test would then suggest that financial reforms have 
significant positive "externalities" on the power sector reforms. 
 Our empirical investigation through panel data regressions yields results that allow us to 
conclude that the power sector reforms have indeed reached some success in improving some 
aspects of the development of this sector. More specifically, we find that private participation in 
generation and distribution has significantly improved power supply, as gauged by higher electricity 
generation per capita, and technical and labor efficiency in the distribution segment, as reflected in 
less power losses in the network and higher volume sold per employee of this segment. The 
unbundling of the generation, transmission, and distribution segments, a policy that paved the way 
for further liberalization reforms (competition and privatization), is found to enhance labor 
efficiency in the distribution segment.   
The creation of a separate regulatory agency was found to have created a better dynamic in 
the generation market by boosting both generation capacity and sales and by giving incentives for 
more efficient use of labor input in the distribution segment. As to regulatory experience, we found 
that it has significantly contributed to improving access to electricity. While the power sector, in 
particular, its generation segment, has significantly benefited from the introduction of independent 
regulation, the beneficial effects of (good) regulatory practices have been exacerbated by the 
modernization of the financial systems. More specifically, improved financial systems have eased 
access to capital for operators allowing them to upgrade their networks and decrease power losses 
in distribution.  
While the econometric analysis conducted in this study will clearly gain from improving the 
dataset, a task which is on our current research agenda, the overall results obtained in this paper 
strongly recommend that along with reforming the power sector, policy makers in developing 
countries should implement the financial reforms that would deepen their domestic financial 
systems thus allowing them to recover the full benefits of these systems’ positive externalities on 
the performance of the sector. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 - Content of variables and data sources 
Variable Content Source 
generationpc Electricity net generation per capita (billion 
Kwh). 
Energy Information Agency (EIA) 
gencapacitypc Installed electricity generation capacity per 
capita (million Kw). 
Idem. 
salesperemp Electricity sold per employee (MWh). Electricity Benchmarking database, 
WB 2007 
distlosses Annual electricity distribution losses as a % of 
net generation. 
Energy Information Agency (EIA) 
ppgen Privatization in generation indicator: dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if there is any 
private participation in electricity generation and 
0 otherwise. 
ESMAP Study, January 19, 2007; 
various reports and websites (see 
references). 
ppdist Private participation in distribution indicator: 
private sector participation as a share of the 
number of connections. 
Idem. 
regsep Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if 
there exists a regulatory agency that regulates 
energy and is separated from the energy ministry 
and 0 otherwise. 
Cubbin and Stern (2006); Electricity 
Regulation database, The World Bank 
and various websites (see references). 
regexp Regulatory authority’s experience indicator 
calculated as the number of years since its 
creation.  
Idem. 
unbundling Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when 
generation, transmission and distribution 
segments are separated and 0 otherwise. 
ESMAP Study, January 19, 2007; 
various reports and websites (see 
references). 
competition Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a 
wholesale market where generators can compete 
to conclude supply contracts with distributors or 
large users exists and 0 otherwise. 
ESMAP Study, January 19, 2007; 
Zhang et al, 2005; various reports and 
websites (see references). 
CBA  Total assets held by the central bank expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. 
The World Bank Financial 
Development and Structure database 
(2007). 
DMBA Total assets held by the financial institutions 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Idem. 
 
CBPC Credit granted by commercial banks to the 
private sector expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Idem. 
 
SMC Value of stock market capitalization expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. 
Idem. 
 
TVT Total value of stocks traded expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Idem. 
 
SMT Stock market turnover ratio calculated as the 
ratio of value of shares traded during a period to 
average market capitalization.  
Idem. 
 
 
findev 
 
countryrisk 
First principal component of CBA,DMBA, 
CBPC, SMC, TVT, and SMT. 
Composite country risk rating reflecting 
political, financial, and economic risk ranging 
from 0 to 100 (the higher the rating the lower the 
risk). 
Computed. 
 
International Country Risk Guide 
database (year). 
 
 
govtstability Indicator of the government's ability to stay in 
office and carry out its declared economic 
program ranging from 0 to 12 (the higher the 
rating, the more stability there is). 
Idem. 
 
 
 
gdp GDP per capita in 2005 USD. ERS International Macroeconomic 
dataset (2008). 
urbanization Population living in urban areas as a share of the 
total population. 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 
population Total population. World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 
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Table A2 - Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Median 
generationpc 672 1335.81 1458.65 65.88 10039.84 861.04 
gencapacitypc 672 16.84 44.62 0.01 442.89 2.56 
salesperemp 209 2057.83 1459.61 101 9248 1846 
distlosses 672 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.47 0.13 
ppgen 512 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 
ppdist 227 49.68 45.55 0.00 100 45.91 
sepreg 624 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.00 
expreg* 624 2.23 4.44 0 25 0 
unbundling 576 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.00 
competition 448 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.00 
findev 419 -0.00 1.77 -2.61 8.85 -0.53 
gdp 672 2740.59 1928.06 35.75 11082.43 2484.97 
urbanization 672 52.82 18.72 15.10 92.30 52.70 
govtstability 576 7.76 2.04 1.00 12.00 8.00 
countryrisk 576 64.69 8.68 35.00 82.00 66.00 
*The maximum value of this variable corresponds to Costa Rica which has created a multi-sector regulatory agency (ARESEP) in 1980. 
 
Table A3 - Correlation coefficients between the sectoral reforms and performance variables 
 ppgen ppdist sepreg expreg unbundling competition findev 
generationpc 0.14 -0.24 0.08 0.14 -0.09 0.11 0.22 
gencapacitypc 0.14 -0.22 0.14 0.19 -0.04 0.16 0.21 
salesperemp 0.33 0.23 0.41 0.55 0.41 0.24 0.52 
distlosses -0.16 -0.29 0.08 -0.10 0.15 0.08 -0.33 
connect -0.18 0.01 0.05 0.245 -0.24 -0.10 0.16 
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Websites 
 
Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission (ZERC): www.zerc.co.zw/about.html 
Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission: www.berc.org.bd/ 
Autorité Nationale de Régulation du Secteur de l'Electricité de Côte d'Ivoire: www.anare.ci 
Egyptian Electric Utility & Consumer Protection Regulatory Agency: www.egyptera.com 
China State electricity regulatory Commission: www.serc.gov.cn 
Moldova National Energy Regulatory Agency: www.anre.md 
Sri Lanka Public Utilities Commission: www.pucsl.gov.lk 
Turkey Energy Markets Regulatory Agency: www.epdk.gov.tr/english/default.asp 
Ukraine National Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC): www.nerc.gov.ua 
Centro Panamericano de Ingeniería Sanitaria y Ciencias del Ambiente (CEPIS): 
http://www.bvsde.paho.org/muwww/fulltext/ppm/ppmbeli.html 
Dominica Electricity Supply Act, 2006: 
http://www.dominica.gov.dm/cms/index.php?q=node/840; 
http://www.dominica.gov.dm/laws/2006/act10-2006.pdf 
India Electricity Regulatory Commission act 1998 
Nigeria: http://www.weathat.com/power-sector-reforms-in-a2219.html 
http://finance.mapsofworld.com/economy-reform/nigeria/power-sector.html 
http://www.ip3.org/pub/2006_publication_001.htm 
Turkey Energy Markets Regulatory Agency: www.epdk.gov.tr/english/default.asp 
Sri Lanka Public Utilities Commission: www.pucsl.gov.lk 
Power sector reforms in Indonesia and China: 
http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art200809190141915 
